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Monetary reformThanks to the recent banking crises interest has grown in banks and how they operate. In the past, the empirical
and institutional market micro-structure of the operation of banks had not been a primary focus for investiga-
tions by researchers, which is why they are not well covered in the literature. One neglected detail is the
banks' function as the creators and allocators of about 97% of the money supply (Werner, 1997, 2005), which
has recently attracted attention (Bank of England, 2014a,b; Werner, 2014b,c). It is the purpose of this paper to
investigate precisely howbanks createmoney, andwhy orwhether companies cannot do the same. Since the im-
plementation of banking operations takes place within a corporate accounting framework, this paper is based
upon a comparative accounting analysis perspective. By breaking the accounting treatment of lending into two
steps, the difference in the accounting operation by bank and non-bank corporations can be isolated. As a result,
it can be established precisely why banks are different and what it is that makes them different: They are
exempted from the Client Money Rules and thus, unlike other ﬁrms, do not have to segregate client money.
This enables banks to classify their accounts payable liabilities arising from bank loan contracts as a different
type of liability called ‘customer deposits’. The ﬁnding is important for many reasons, including for modelling
the banking sector accurately in economic models, bank regulation and also for monetary reform proposals
that aim at taking away the privilege ofmoney creation frombanks. The paper thus adds to the growing literature
on the institutional details and market micro-structure of our ﬁnancial and monetary system, and in particular
offers a new contribution to the literature on ‘whatmakes banks different’, from an accounting and regulatory per-
spective, solving the puzzle of why banks combine lending and deposit-taking operations under one roof.
© 2014 Published by Elsevier Inc.1. Introduction
Thanks to the recent banking crises interest has grown in the details
of how banks operate. In recent decades, the empirical and institutional
micro-structure of how banks operate had not been a primary focus of
attention by investigators. This lack of interest may partly be due to
the predominance of the hypothetico-deductive research methodology
in economics, which begins by posing axioms and assumptions. Such a
theoretical and hypothetical framework has also been the basis for
bank regulations. As is well known to historians, realitymay be less log-
ical and rational than the designers of theoretical constructs may envis-
age. This is known in other areas of ﬁnance, where market and investor
behaviour often does not conform to the precepts of theoretically posed
‘rational agents’. By contrast, an inductive approach begins by establish-
ing the empirical facts.
Over the past century and a half, three competing theories of bank-
ing have been inﬂuential — the ﬁnancial intermediation, the fractionalwith MrWesleyWright, helpful
of all, the source of all wisdomreserve and the credit creation theories of banking. Most current
models, theories and textbooks in ﬁnance and economics assert the va-
lidity of the ﬁnancial intermediation theory. According to it, banks do
not have the ability to create money, neither individually (as the credit
creation theory argues) nor collectively (as the fractional reserve theory
maintains). Recently, two events have upset the status quo in this de-
bate. The Bank of England has come forward clearly in support of the
credit creation theory (Bank of England, 2014a, 2014b). Secondly, the
ﬁrst empirical tests of the three theories have been conducted
(Werner, 2014a, 2014c). These tests showed that the ﬁnancial interme-
diation and fractional reserve theories are not supported by the evi-
dence: Banks do not gather deposits and then lend these out, as the
ﬁnancial intermediation theory assumes. Nor do they draw down
their deposits at the central bank in order to lend, as the fractional re-
serve theory of banking maintains. The empirical facts are only consis-
tent with the credit creation theory of banking. According to this
theory, banks can individually create credit and money out of nothing,
and they do this when they extend credit. When a loan is granted by a
bank, it purchases the loan contract (legally considered a promissory
note issued by the borrower), which is reﬂected by an increase in its as-
sets by the amount of the loan. The borrower ‘receives’ the ‘money’
when the bank credits the borrower's account at the bank with the
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credit creation 97% of the money supply is created in the UK today
(Werner, 2005), and similar proportions apply to most industrialised
economies. Not surprisingly, the use to which bank credit is put to de-
termines its effect, namely whether bank credit is extended for produc-
tive, consumptive, or speculative purposes (the Quantity Theory of
Credit, see Werner, 1997, 2005, 2012a).
One reason for the neglect of the institutional and operational details
of banks in the research literature in the past decades is likely the fact
that no law, statute or bank regulation explicitly grants banks the
right (usually considered a sovereign prerogative) to create and allocate
the money supply. As a result, many economists, ﬁnance researchers,
lawyers, accountants, even bankers, let alone the general public, have
not been aware of the role of banks as creators and allocators of the
money supply.
The establishment of these facts motivates a number of new re-
searchquestions,manyofwhichdid not arisewithin the two alternative
theories of banking. In this paper the question is considered of what ex-
actly it is that enables banks to individually create credit andmoney out
of nothing, and why or whether other ﬁnancial ﬁrms and intermedi-
aries, or ordinary corporations not active in the ﬁnancial sector, cannot
do likewise. Is what enables banks to create money a feature unique to
banks, or is Minsky's (1986) claim more relevant that “everyone can
issue money”? Being able to create money is a desirable ability, and if
it was possible for other agents to do so, they would likely also engage
in this activity. Are non-bank ﬁnancial institutions, including so-called
‘shadow banks’, engaged in money creation? With ﬁnancial deregula-
tion and the development of hybrid ﬁnancial instruments, the demarca-
tion between banks and non-banks often is said to be elusive. Is it
possible to pinpoint the difference?
Furthermore, there are a number of fundamental questions
concerning banks that remain unanswered in the literature. “What are
the deﬁning characteristics of a bank?” ask Kashyap, Rajan, and Stein
(2002). Speciﬁcally, it remains a conundrum to economists why banks
combine what are effectively very different operations, namely
deposit-taking and granting of loans, and why securities or capital mar-
kets cannot substitute these functions, despite in theory being capable
of doing so separately:
“…commercial banks are institutions that engage in two distinct types
of activities, one on each side of the balance sheet—deposit-taking and
lending. …A great deal of theoretical and empirical analysis has been
devoted to understanding the circumstances under which each of these
two activities might require the services of an intermediary, as opposed
to being implemented in arm's-length securities markets. While much
has been learned from this work, with few exceptions it has not ad-
dressed a fundamental question:why is it important that one institution
carry out both functions under the same roof?” (Kashyap et al., 2002,
p. 33f).
They also argue that it is of utmost importance to answer this
question:
“The question ofwhether or not there is a real synergy between deposit-
taking and lending has far-reaching implications” (op. cit., p. 34).
They cite the question ofmonetary reform as one of the reasonswhy
the question needs to be answered. Their own answer is based on the
provision of loan commitments by banks— a particular institutional fea-
ture that does not apply to all banks anddoes not usually dominate bank
lending. It is hence difﬁcult to argue that the question they raise has
been answered fully. This is especially true, since the authors are adher-
ents of the ﬁnancial intermediation theory of banking which claims, er-
roneously, that banks gather deposits and then lend these deposits out.
It is the purpose of this article to offer new answers to these ques-
tions, which are in line with the empirical record. Joseph Schumpeter
(1917/18) argued that banking is primarily accounting, and that banksare the ‘bookkeeping centre’ of the economy and act as its ‘social ac-
countants’ (1934, p. 124). Stiglitz and Weiss (1989) also consider
banks as operating ‘society's accounting system’. Werner (2014a,
2014c) shows that the three theories of banking are distinguished by
their differing bank accounting and that the crucial difference of banks
and ﬁrms without a banking licence revolves around the issue of lend-
ing. Werner (2005) had argued:
“Bank credit creation does not channel existing money to new uses. It
newly creates money that did not exist beforehand and channels it to
some use…. What makes this ‘creative accounting’ possible is the other
function of banks as the settlement system of all non-cash transactions
in the economy. … Since banks work as the accountants of record –
while the rest of the economy assumes they are honest accountants –
it is possible for the banks to increase themoney in the accounts of some
of us (those who receive a loan), by simply altering the ﬁgures. Nobody
else will notice, because agents cannot distinguish between money that
had actually been saved and deposited and money that has been creat-
ed ‘out of nothing’ by the bank” (p. 179).
However, surprisingly little has been written about the actual ac-
counting details of bank operations, especially concerning their lending,
and how precisely it differs from the accounting of non-bank ﬁrms. It is
thus corporate accounting that we must turn to in order to analyse the
questions at hand in a comparative analysis of the treatment of lending
by different types of corporate lenders.
2. Comparative accounting of lending
Although the implementation of banking services relies heavily on
accounting, hardly any scholarly literature exists that explains in detail
the accounting mechanics of bank credit creation and precisely how
bank accounting differs from corporate accounting of non-bank ﬁrms.
There is also virtually no scholarly literature on the question of which
regulations precisely enable banks to create money. These issues are
however of great interest, especially since the function of banks as the
creators and allocators of the money supply is not explicitly stated in
any law, statute, regulation, ordinance, directive or court judgement.
From the absence of explicit statutory powers to createmoney it can
be deduced that this ability of banks is likely derived from the opera-
tional, that is, accounting conventions and regulations of banking.
These either differ from those of non-banks, so that only banks are
able to create money, or else non-banks have missed out on the signif-
icant opportunities money creation may afford.
In order to identify the difference in accounting treatment of the
lending operation by banks, we adopt a comparative accounting analy-
sis perspective. For this purpose, we compare the accounting of a loan
extended by (a) a non-ﬁnancial corporation (NFC, such as a manufac-
turer extending a ﬁnancial loan to a supplier), (b) a non-bank ﬁnancial
institution (NBFI, such as a stock broker extending amargin loan to a cli-
ent) and (c) a bank. Table 1 shows the changes in balance sheets of a
new loan of $100 m, after its issuance and remittance.
When the non-ﬁnancial corporation, such as a manufacturer, grants
a loan to another ﬁrm, the loan contract is shown as an increase in as-
sets: the ﬁrm now has an additional claim on debtors — this is the
borrower's promise to repay the loan. The lender purchases the loan
contract, treated as a promissory note. Meanwhile, when the ﬁrm dis-
burses the loan (and hence discharges its obligation to make the
money available to the borrower), it is drawing down its cash reserves
ormonetary deposits with its banks. As a result, one gross asset increase
ismatched by an equally-sized gross asset decrease, leaving net total as-
sets unchanged.
In the second case, of a non-bank ﬁnancial institution, such as a stock
broker engaging in margin lending, the loan contract is the claim on the
borrower that is added as an asset to the balance sheet, while the dis-
bursement of the loan – for instance by transferring it to the client or
Table 1
Comparative accounting: taking out a loan and disbursing it.
This table shows how accounting conventions handle the granting and disbursing of a loan by different types of ﬁrms: a
non-ﬁnancial corporation (NFC), a non-bank ﬁnancial institution (NBFI, e.g. a stock broker), and a bank. In this and the fol-
lowing tables, only the change in balance sheet items is shown. As can be seen, something is different in the case of the bank.
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reduces the ﬁrm's monetary balances (likely held with a bank). As a
result, total assets and total liabilities remain unchanged.
While the balance sheet total is not affected by the granting and dis-
bursement of the loan in the case of ﬁrms other than banks, the picture
looks very different in the case of a bank.While the loan contract shows
up as an increase in assets with all types of corporations, in the case of a
bank the disbursement of the loan takes a different form from that of the
other ﬁrms: it appears as a positive entry on the liability side of the bal-
ance sheet, as opposed to being a negative entry on the asset side, as in
the case of non-banks. As a result, it does not counter-balance the in-
creased gross assets. Instead, both assets and liabilities expand. The
bank's balance sheet lengthens on both sides by the amount of the
loan (see the empirical evidence in Werner, 2014a, 2014c). Thus it is
clear that banks conduct their accounting operations differently from
others, even differently from their near-relatives, thenon-bankﬁnancial
institutions.
What precisely, however, causes this very different treatment of
lending on bank balance sheets as opposed to its treatment by all
other types of ﬁrms? In order to answer this question, the comparison
of the above accounting information is insufﬁcient. It is necessary to
gain further, more detailed insight into the accounting operations
shown in Table 1. Speciﬁcally, what is it that enables banks to discharge
their loanwithout drawing down any assets (as both theﬁnancial inter-
mediation and fractional reserve theories of banking had indeed main-
tained, erroneously)?
In order to answer this question, the device is chosen to break
down what currently is one set of double-entry operations, into
smaller steps in order to be able to analyse them in greater detail.
Speciﬁcally, the lending process is broken down into two steps,
whose accounting representations are shown separately and in se-
quence. Assume, for instance, that the borrower asked out of conve-
nience to proceed with signing the loan contract, but for the
disbursement of the loan to be delayed by a week, while all other
paper work and accounting are completed. In other words, the act
of signing a loan contract and both borrower and lender contractually
agreeing to their respective obligations is analytically and practicallyTable 2
Disaggregating lending: Step 1 — lender and borrower agree.
This table shows Step 1 of the loan operation, now disaggregated in
borrower has asked, out of convenience, to delay the disbursement
is seen that the accounting treatment is the same for all lenders, inc
Step 1.separated from the act of disbursing the loan and thereby the lender
discharging the lender's obligation to pay out the funds.
Step 1 shows the loan upon signing, committing both parties to their
respective obligations (the bank to pay soon, the borrower to repaywith
interestmuch later). At this stage the loan funds are not yet made avail-
able by the lender. So the lender has an open liability, namely the dis-
bursement of the loan to the borrower. In corporate accounting this is
identiﬁed as a liability of the category ‘accounts payable’. (Step 2 will
then describe the situation when the lender has in fact made the loan
money available to the borrower and thus discharged the liability aris-
ing from its accounts payable item to the borrower.) Table 2 shows
Step 1 of this disaggregated lending operation, by recording the changes
in balance sheet items.
The same operation is shown for the non-ﬁnancial corporation, the
non-bank ﬁnancial institution and for the bank (Table 2). In all cases,
in Step 1 the loan contract creates an asset for the lender, as the
money will be repaid in the future, and a liability in the form of the ‘ac-
counts payable’, as the loaned money will have to be made available to
the borrower at some stage. Therefore, for all types of ﬁrms, including
banks, the balance sheet lengthens, as both an asset and a liability is
added to the balance sheet.What emerges is, therefore that, surprising-
ly, in Step 1, the accounting is identical for all types of ﬁrms, including
the bank. In other words, whatever makes banks different and special
fromnon-banks is not visible in the act of agreeing to and implementing
a loan contract without disbursing it. Moreover, we see what lengthens
the balance sheet of ﬁrms – any ﬁrm, not just banks – namely agreeing
to lend money, while not (yet) paying out the funds to the borrower.
That banks and non-banks are identical in their operations at this
stage is an interesting ﬁnding. Upon reﬂection, it is not surprising, as it
makes legal and regulatory sense: The act of granting a loan by one
legal person to another is not a regulated activity. Business lending in
the UK does not require authorisation of any supervisory or regulatory
authority. Thus any ﬁrm can specialise in lending to other companies
at interest, without requiring any authorisation from the ﬁnancial regu-
lators (Financial Conduct Authority or Prudential Regulatory Authority)
or a banking licence in general. Hence it would indeed be surprising to
see accounting differences in the operations conducted so far.to two steps. All parties have signed the loan contract, but the
of the loan, which happens in Step 2. Interestingly, at Step 1 it
luding the bank. Banks are not different in anyway concerning
Table 3
Disaggregating lending: Step 2 — loan funds paid out.
This table shows Step 2 of the loan operation, disaggregated into two steps. All lenders now disburse the loan and thus dis-
charge their liability. For ﬁrms without a banking licence, the balance sheet contracts and thus reverts back to the original
position. For banks only the balance sheet remains unchanged in its expanded position — banks remain stuck in Step 1. In
other words: banks do not discharge their liability.
1 http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Discharge+from+Liability.
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from the lender to the borrower. We now already know that whatever
it is that enables banks to create money out of nothing, it must take
place in the act of making loan funds available to the borrower.
Considering the comparative accounting in Step 2, we observe that
for the ﬁrm (NFC) and the broker (NBFI) to make the funds available
to the borrower, so that the borrower can use them for transactions, in-
volves drawing down the lender's monetary funds (cash at hand, or the
lender's deposit balances held with a bank): ﬁrms need to give some-
thing up, when they pay out the loan (Table 3). Hence, as the money
is made available, the cash or deposit balance (an asset) is drawn
down and simultaneously the accounts payable item disappears from
the ﬁrm's liabilities: the ﬁrm has paid its account payable and thus
discharged its obligation. For ﬁrms without a bank licence, the disburse-
ment of the loan is from funds elsewhere within the ﬁrm. Thus there is an
equal reduction in balance of another account from which the lent funds
came from. Therefore, the balance sheet shrinks again. There is no over-
all change in the total size of the balance sheet as a result of Steps 1 and
2 together.
However, as can be seen in Table 3, the story is quite different for
the bank. Surprisingly, we ﬁnd that unlike the other ﬁrms whose
balance sheets shrank back in Step 2, the bank's accounts seem in
standstill, unchanged from Step 1. The total balance sheet remains
lengthened. No balance is drawn down to make a payment to the
borrower.
So how is it that the borrower feels that the bank's obligation to
make funds available are being met? (If indeed they are being met).
This is done through the one, small but crucial accounting change that
does take place on the liability side of the bank balance sheet in Step
2: the bank reduces its ‘account payable’ item by the loan amount, act-
ing as if the money had been disbursed to the customer, and at the
same time it presents the customer with a statement that identiﬁes
this same obligation of the bank to the borrower, but now simply re-
classiﬁed as a ‘customer deposit’ of the borrower with the bank.
The bank, having ‘disbursed’ the loan, remains in a position where it
still owes the money. In other words, the bank does not actually make
any money available to the borrower: No transfer of funds from any-
where to the customer or indeed the customer's account takes place.
There is no equal reduction in the balance of another account to defray
the borrower. Instead, the bank simply re-classiﬁed its liabilities, chang-
ing the ‘accounts payable’ obligation arising from the bank loan contract
to another liability category called ‘customer deposits’.
While the borrower is given the impression that the bank had trans-
ferred money from its capital, reserves or other accounts to the
borrower's account (as indeed major theories of banking, the ﬁnancial
intermediation and fractional reserve theories, erroneously claim), in
reality this is not the case. Neither the bank nor the customer deposited
any money, nor were any funds from anywhere outside the bank
utilised to make the deposit in the borrower's account. Indeed, there
was no depositing of any funds.
In Step 1 the bank had a liability — an obligation to pay someone.
How can it discharge this liability? A law dictionary states:“The most common way to be discharged from liability … is through
payment.”1
And yet, no payment takes place in Step 2 (and hence in the entire
‘lending’ process), which is why the bank's balance sheet in total re-
mains stuck in Step 1, when all lenders still owe the money to their re-
spective borrowers. The bank's liability is simply re-named a 'bank
deposit'. However, bank deposits are deﬁned by central banks as being
part of the ofﬁcial money supply (as measured in such ofﬁcial ‘money
supply’ aggregates as M1, M2, M3 or M4). This conﬁrms that banks cre-
atemoneywhen they grant a loan: they invent a ﬁctitious customer de-
posit, which the central bank and all users of our monetary system,
consider to be ‘money’, indistinguishable from ‘real’ deposits not
newly invented by the banks. Thus banks do not just grant credit, they
create credit, and simultaneously they create money.
While other non-bank ﬁrms can also grant credit, in their case it
would be misleading to speak of ‘credit creation’, since their granting
of a loan results in a gross increase in credit (and temporary lengthening
of their balance sheet; Step 1), but thedischarging of their accounts pay-
able liability arising from the loan contract results in an equal reduction
in another credit balance, resulting in a reduction of the overall balance
sheet and thus no change in total net credit or money in the economy
(Step 2). There is no money creation in the case of ﬁrms that are not
banks.
The bank, on the other hand, creates gross credit, just like non-
banks, but this is not counter-balanced by an equal reduction in credit
balances elsewhere, leaving a net positive addition to credit and deposit
— hence money — balances: net credit creation. This credit creation is
visible in the permanent expansion in the bank's balance sheet, and is
executed through the operation that makes banks unique, namely that
instead of discharging their liability to pay out loans, the banks merely
reclassify their liabilities originating from loan contracts from what
should be an ‘accounts payable’ item to ‘customer deposit’ (in practise
of course skipping Step 1 entirely and thus neglecting to record the ac-
counts payable item). The bank issues a statement of its liability to the
borrower, which records its liability as a ‘deposit’ of the borrower at
the bank.
We have gained important insights, which raise new questions:
Why are non-banks not able to do the same, and what precisely is it
that allows banks to act differently in Step 2? Could non-banks also cre-
ate credit in this way? A necessary condition for being able to create an
imaginary deposit in the name of the borrower is that the lender
ordinarily maintains customer deposits and thus is solely in charge of
the record-keeping of customers' deposits. In this case, this controlling
power over customers' deposit account records can be used to invent
make-belief customer deposits that did not in fact originate from any
new deposits (and hence cannot honestly be called 'deposits').
Maintaining customer deposits is not part of the regular business op-
erations of non-ﬁnancial institutions, so we cannot expect them to be
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ber of non-bankﬁnancial institutions that in the course of ordinary busi-
ness do maintain deposit accounts for their customers — for instance,
stock broking ﬁrms. Why, then, are stock brokers which receive client
funds and deposits, not able to create credit and money out of nothing,
just like banks?
3. Regulation: the little-known ‘client money rules’
It is necessary to move beyond corporate accounting rules to the
wider ﬁeld of regulations of business conduct. Tobin (1963) argued
about banks that
“Any other ﬁnancial industry subject to the same kind of regulations
would behave in much the same way” (p. 418).
This is likely true, but the question remains precisely which regula-
tions are crucial to allow banks to engage in the activity that makes
them unique, and likewise, which regulations, if applying equally to
non-banks, would allow non-banks to behave in the same way as
banks. As noted, lending to other ﬁrms is unregulated. It is necessary
to examine the regulations of the business of taking customer deposits.
An examination of the regulations concerning this reveals that, unlike
the lending business, it is a highly restricted type of activity. Regulations
differ starkly between banks and non-banks.
In the UK, the cradle of modern banking, ﬁnancial regulations,
speciﬁcally, the so-called ‘Client Money Rules’ (FCA, 2013), require all
ﬁrms that hold client money to segregate such money in accounts that
keep them separate from the assets or liabilities of the ﬁrm itself:
“Depositing Client Money
7.4.1. R
A ﬁrm, on receiving any client money, must promptly place this money
into one or more accounts opened with any of the following:
(1) a central bank;
(2) a CRD credit institution2;
(3) a bank authorised in a third country;
(4) a qualifying money market fund” FCA (2013).
For ﬁrms that do not have a banking authorisation, client deposits
must be held in segregated accounts with banks or money market
funds. This means the client assets remain off-balance sheet for the
ﬁrm, including non-bank ﬁnancial intermediaries, and the depositor re-
mains the legal owner. This is why the extension of a bank loan by a
stock broker cannot result in any addition to the balance sheet: the
stock broker will owe the borrower themoney (an increase in accounts
payable), but since any account of the borrower is not held directly with
the stock broker, it is not possible for the stock broker (or other non-
bank entities) to mix the clients' deposit accounts with the other
liabilities that the broker has towards the clients (such as an accounts
payable item arising from loan contracts). So it would be impossible
for the stock broker to engage in the re-classiﬁcation exercise of
referring to accounts payable items as (imaginary) customer deposits.
However, things are different, if one has a banking licence:
“Depositaries
1.4.6 R The client money chapter does not apply to a depositary when
acting as such” …2 FCA Handbook Glossary: “CRD credit institution means a credit institution that has its
registered ofﬁce (or, if it has no registered ofﬁce, its head ofﬁce) in an EEA State…” (FCA,
2013).“Chapter 7 Client Money Rules
Credit Institutions and Approved Banks
7.1.8 R The clientmoney rules do not apply to a CRD credit institution in
relation to deposits within the meaning of the CRD held by that institu-
tion. …
7.1.9. G If a credit institution that holds money as a deposit with itself is
subject to the requirement to disclose information before providing ser-
vices, it should, in compliancewith that obligation, notify the client that:
(1) money held for that client in an account with the credit institution
will be held by the ﬁrm as banker and not as trustee (or in Scotland as
agent); and (2) as a result, the money will not be held in accordance
with the client money rules” (FCA, 2013).
It follows then that what enables banks to create credit and hence
money is their exemption from the Client Money Rules. Thanks to this
exemption they are allowed to keep customer deposits on their own
balance sheet. This means that depositors who deposit their money
with a bank are no longer the legal owners of this money. Instead,
they are just one of the general creditors of the bank whom it owes
money to. It also means that the bank is able to access the records of
the customer deposits held with it and invent a new ‘customer deposit’
that had not actually been paid in, but instead is a re-classiﬁed accounts
payable liability of the bank arising from a loan contract.
Whether the Client Money Rules were designed for this purpose,
and whether it is indeed lawful for banks to reclassify general ‘accounts
payable’ items as speciﬁc liabilities deﬁned as ‘customer deposits’, with-
out the act of depositing having been undertaken by anyone, is a matter
that requires further legal scrutiny, beyond the scope of this paper.
We conclude that by disaggregating bank lending into two steps we
have identiﬁed precisely how banks create credit, and we have solved a
long-standing conundrum in the literature, namelywhy banks combine
what at ﬁrst appear to be two very different businesses: lending on the
one hand, and deposit-taking on the other. The answer is that banks are
not ﬁnancial intermediaries, but creators of themoney supply, whereby
the act of creating money is contingent on banks maintaining customer
deposit accounts, because themoney is invented in the form of ﬁctitious
customer deposits that are actually re-classiﬁed 'accounts payable' lia-
bilities emanating from loan contracts. Banks could not do this if they
did not combine lending and deposit taking activities. But, as we saw,
combining these activities is a necessary yet insufﬁcient condition for
being able to create credit andmoney. The necessary and sufﬁcient con-
dition for being able to create credit andmoney is being exempt from the
Client Money Rules.
Kashyap et al. (2002) argued that what makes banks unique and the
reasonwhy they engage in the two tasks of lending and deposit-taking si-
multaneously was the granting of loan commitments and the resulting
need for liquidity provision. However, loan commitments are a subset of
lending activity, andwehave found thatwhatmakes banks unique and re-
quires them to combine lendingwith deposit-taking does not derive from
the lending function per se— since business lending is not even regulated,
so that anyone can engage in it without a licence, and, as we saw, the im-
pact of signing a loan contract is common to all ﬁrms (Step 1 in the disag-
gregated accounting of lending).
What makes banks unique and explains the combination of lending
and deposit-taking under one roof is the more fundamental fact that
they do not have to segregate client accounts, and thus are able to engage
in an exercise of ‘re-labelling’ and mixing different liabilities, speciﬁcally
by re-assigning their accounts payable liabilities incurred when entering
into loan agreements, to another category of liability called ‘customer
deposits’.
What distinguishes banks from non-banks is their ability to cre-
ate credit and money through lending, which is accomplished by
booking what actually are accounts payable liabilities as imaginary
customer deposits, and this is in turn made possible by a particular
regulation that renders banks unique: their exemption from the Cli-
ent Money Rules.
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The argument that it is bank regulation that makes banks special
has been used to justify deregulation of interest rates and reserve re-
quirements. The logic was that it was the regulation of interest rates
and reserve requirements that made banks different and hindered a
level playing ﬁeld. However, this argument has not focused on what
really makes banks different from other ﬁrms. It is in the business of
taking deposits that the regulations make a crucial difference for
banks and non-banks. It would appear that those who argue that
bank regulations should be liberalised in order to create a level
playing ﬁeld with non-banks have neglected to demand that the
banks' unique exemption from the Client Money Rules – a regulation
beneﬁtting only banks – needs to be deregulated as well, so that
banks must also conform to the Client Money Rules. Indeed, it
would appear that monetary reformers (see, for instance, Benes
and Kumhof, 2012) could very simply achieve their goal of revoking
the banks' ability to create money through credit creation, by simply
scrapping banks' exemption from the Client Money Rules. In the case
of UK regulation, deleting CASS 7, 1.4.6 and 7.1.8. should be sufﬁcient.3
A reasonable justiﬁcation for cancelling the banks' exemption would be
the fact that (a) no reasonable grounds for their exemption have been
made, and (b) banks have routinely abused this exemption in order to
misrepresent other liabilities as ‘customer deposits’. While the latter
would not have been possible if the Client Money Rules had applied to
banks, it is not obvious that the Client Money Rules were designed for
this purpose.
Alternatively, one could argue that it would level the playing ﬁeld, if
the banks' current exemption from the Client Money Rules was also
granted to all other ﬁrms — in other words, if the Client Money Rules
themselves were abolished. This would allow all ﬁrms to also engage in
the kind of creative accounting that has become an established practise
among banks. It would certainly ensure that competition between
banks andnon-bankﬁnancial institutionswould becomemoremeaning-
ful, since the exemption from the Client Money Rules, together with the
banks' deployment of this exemption for the purpose of re-labelling their
liabilities, has given signiﬁcant competitive advantages to banks over all
other types ofﬁrms: banks have been able to create and allocatemoney –
virtually the entire money supply in the economy –while no other ﬁrm
is able to do the same. However, apart from the new risks for the public
arising from such deregulation, even in this case banks would maintain
their advantage and their monopoly on money creation, if the state
maintained the rule that taxes need to be paid in privately created
bank money only: Today, tax payments cannot be made in legal tender
(Bank of England notes), but only in bank credit money, which is private
company credit, created by banks' re-classiﬁcation of their accounts pay-
able liabilities as imaginary customer deposits. By forcing all tax payers to
acquire bankmoney in thisway, the state effectively transfers sovereign-
ty over money creation to the banks. The importance of the denomina-
tion of taxes has long been recognised. Adam Smith commented on it
as follows:
“A prince, who should enact that a certain proportion of his taxes should
be paid in a paper money of a certain kind, might thereby give a certain
value to this paper money” (1776, p. 328).
The ﬁndings are important also for other types of reforms, including
the reform of bank regulation. So far, bank regulation has emphasised
capital adequacy requirements in order to manage bank activity. This
has failed spectacularly, as Basel I could not prevent, and likely contrib-
uted to the propagation of the Japanese and Asian crises in the 1990s,
and Basel II is similarly implicated in the 2008 ﬁnancial crisis. As3 For amore detailed discussion of how to implementmonetary reformby changing the
Client Money Rules, please seeWerner (2012b), which was submitted upon invitation to
the Althing, Iceland's Parliament.Werner (2005, 2010, 2014a, 2014c) argues, Basel rules were doomed
to failure, since they consider banks as ﬁnancial intermediaries, when
in actual fact they are the creators of the money supply. Since banks in-
vent money as ﬁctitious deposits, it can be readily shown that capital
adequacy based bank regulation does not have to restrict bank activity:
banks can create money and hence can arrange for money to be made
available to purchase newly issued shares that increase their bank cap-
ital. In other words, banks could simply invent the money that is then
used to increase their capital. This is what Barclays Bank did in 2008,
in order to avoid the use of tax money to shore up the bank's capital:
Barclays ‘raised’ £5.8 bn in new equity from Gulf sovereign wealth in-
vestors— by, it has transpired, lending them themoney! As is explained
in Werner (2014a), Barclays implemented a standard loan operation,
thus inventing the £5.8 bn deposit ‘lent’ to the investor. This deposit
was then used to ‘purchase’ the newly issued Barclays shares. Thus in
this case the bank liability originating from the bank loan to the Gulf
investor transmuted from (1) an accounts payable liability to (2) a cus-
tomer deposit liability, to ﬁnally end up as (3) equity— another catego-
ry on the liability side of the bank's balance sheet. Effectively, Barclays
invented its own capital. This certainly was cheaper for the UK tax
payer than using tax money. As publicly listed companies in general
are not allowed to lend money to ﬁrms for the purpose of buying their
stocks, it was not in conformity with the Companies Act 2006
(Section 678, Prohibition of assistance for acquisition of shares in public
company). But regulators were willing to overlook this. As Werner
(2014b) argues, using central bank or bank credit creation is in principle
the most cost-effective way to clean up the banking system and ensure
that bank credit growth recovers quickly. The Barclays case is however
evidence that stricter capital requirements do not necessary prevent
banks from expanding credit and money creation, since their creation
of deposits generates more purchasing power with which increased
bank capital can also be funded. To manage bank credit creation more
effectively, the differing consequences of different types of lending
need to be recognised (bank credit creation for ﬁnancial transactions af-
fects asset prices and is in aggregate unsustainable, bank credit for con-
sumption affects consumer prices, and bank credit for productive
investment purposes is sustainable and non-inﬂationary, as the Quanti-
ty Theory of Credit, Werner, 1997, maintains). Given the reality of mar-
ket imperfections and rationing, more direct interventions in the credit
market, in the form of 'guidance' of bank credit (for instance by
curtailing costly and dangerous ﬁnancial credit creation) need to be
re-considered (Werner, 2005). They have a good track record for
preventing credit and hence asset boom-bust cycle. Alternatively, the
structure of the banking system needs to be designed such that it is
dominated by banks that mainly lend for productive investments in
the ordinary course of their business, such as local banks lending to
SMEs (Werner, 2013).5. Conclusion
In this paper a number of fundamental questions concerning banks
have been answered. This includes the old questions ofwhy banks com-
bine what are effectively very different operations, namely deposit-
taking and granting of loans under one roof, what are the “deﬁning
characteristics of a bank”, and “why securities markets and non-bank
ﬁrms cannot do the same” (Kashyap et al., 2002). It also includes new
questions predicated on the recognition that banks create credit and
money, namely what exactly it is that enables banks to create credit
and money out of nothing, and whether or why other ﬁnancial ﬁrms
and intermediaries, or ordinary corporations cannot do the same. This
includes the question of whether non-bank ﬁnancial institutions, in-
cluding so-called ‘shadow banks’, can engage in money creation as
well, the question whether “everyone can issue money” (Minsky,
1986), and the questions of how bank regulation should and howmon-
etary reform could be structured.
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and money creation were examined in a comparison of corporate ac-
counting for lending. Breaking the act of lending into two steps, it was
possible to isolate just what makes bank accounting different from the
accounting of non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms and non-bank ﬁnancial institutions,
and precisely how banks manage to create money newly. The act of
signing the loan contract and purchasing it as a promissory note of the
borrower without yet making the borrowed funds available to the bor-
rower (Step 1) has the same accounting implications for banks, non-
banks and non-ﬁnancial corporations alike. In all cases, the balance
sheets lengthen, as an asset (the loan contract) is acquired and a liability
to make money available to the borrower is incurred (accounts pay-
able). In Step 2, the lender makes the funds available to the borrower.
The fact that in Step 2 the bank is alone among ﬁrms in showing the
same total impact on assets and liabilities as everyone else at Step 1,
when the money had not yet been made available to the borrower,
demonstrates that the bank did not actually make any money available
to the borrower. This means that the bank still has an open ‘accounts
payable’ liability, as it has not in fact discharged its original liability.
What banks do is to simply reclassify their accounts payable items aris-
ing from the act of lending as ‘customer deposits’, and the general pub-
lic, when receiving payment in the form of a transfer of bank deposits,
believes that a form of money had been paid into the bank. As a result,
the public readily accepts such ‘bankdeposits’ and their ‘transfers’ to de-
fray payments. They are also themain component of the ofﬁcial ‘money
supply’ as announced by central banks (M1, M2, M3, M4), which is cre-
ated almost entirely through this act of re-classifying banks' accounts
payable as ﬁctitious ‘customer deposits’. No wonder an expert in bank
accounting has warned me, upon presentation of my analysis, that I
must never use the concept of ‘accounts payable’ in the context of bank
accounting! In my view, the only reason why one would not wish to
use it as presented in this paper is because through this device the
truth is revealed for all to see.
The ‘lending’ bank records a new ‘customer deposit’ and informs the
‘borrower’ that funds have been ‘deposited’ in the borrower's account.
Since neither the borrower nor the bank actually made a deposit at the
bank— nor, in connectionwith this transaction, anyone else for thatmat-
ter, it remains necessary to analyse the legal aspects of bank operations.
In particular, the legality of the act of reclassifying bank liabilities (ac-
counts payable) as ﬁctitious customer deposits requires further, separate
analysis. This is all the more so, since no law, statute or bank regula-
tion actually grants banks the right (usually considered a sovereign
prerogative) to create and allocate the money supply. Further, the
regulation that allows only banks to conduct such creative accounting
(namely the exemption from the Client Money Rules) is potentially
being abused through the act of ‘renaming’ the bank's own accounts
payable liabilities as ‘customer deposits’ when no deposits had been
made, since this is also not explicitly referred to in the banks' exemption
from the Client Money Rules, or in any other statutes, laws or regula-
tions, for that matter.
This raises the broader problem that much of the terminology in
banking appears to mislead the public. An innocent bank customer
could be forgiven for believing that money ‘deposited’ with a bank
was still the property of the depositor and hence safe in the case of a
bankruptcy of the institution, while money deposited with a stock bro-
ker with the intention to speculate in the markets was at risk of being
lost should the stock broker go bust. That the legal reality is precisely
the opposite – money deposited with stock brokers is unencumbered
by the broker's bankruptcy since it remains the property of the depositor,
held in safe custody as segregated Client Money, while money depos-
ited with a bank, exempt from the Client Money Rules, is no longer
the property of the depositor and thus in principle goes under together
with the bank – is testament to the misleading character of banking
terminology.
In this paper it was found that banks combine what are effectively
very different operations, namely deposit-taking and granting of loansunder one roof, because in this way they can invent new money in the
form of ﬁctitious ‘customer deposits’ when purporting to engage in
the act of ‘lending’. It was found that the deﬁning characteristic of
banks is that they are exempt from the Client Money Rules, which pre-
vent other ﬁrms from creating money in the same way. It was found
that, in practise, only banks can issue money in this way. It was also
found that bank regulation needs to be reconsidered, as focusing on cap-
ital adequacy, already proven ineffective by the many banking crises
since its introduction in the 1980s, is likely to remain unable to prevent
credit booms and subsequent banking crises. Finally, a simple way was
found to implement monetary reform, should the sovereign – the
people – decide to introduce a more transparent way of creating and
allocating the money supply: one only needs to revoke the one-sided
exemption from the ClientMoney Rules granted to banks (and combine
thiswith ClientMoney custody services offered to all banks byHMTrea-
sury). Having said this, since the privilege to createmney is a public pre-
rogative, it can be justiﬁed if it is used for the beneﬁt of the public. How
can this be achieved? I have come to be convinced that probably the
best method to implement monetary reform realistically – since possi-
ble without waiting for grand top-down reforms and since in this way
breaking power up into small, manageable units – is to establish many
small, local, not-for-proﬁt community banks, as the success of the Ger-
man economy has demonstrated over the past 170 years.References
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